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In reviewing recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals concerning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related
issues, one finds cases dealing with topics such as: "What Law Gov-
erns?"1; "Directed Verdicts"2 ; "Judgment N.O.V." 3; "Rule 52(A) and
Scope of Review"4 ; "Precedential Value of the Supreme Court's Su-
premacy Affirmance"5 ; "Attorney's Fees"6 ; "Appealable Orders7;
"Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel" 8; "Summary Judgment"9 ;
"Right to Jury Trial"'°; "When Exercise of Strategy Option Constitutes
Waiver on Appeal""; "Judge's Conduct a Trial"r' 2 ; "Certification to
* Kenneth E. Gray is presently an Assistant Professor of Law at UT/Chicago-
Kent College of Law. He received his B.A. degree from Iona College in 1966. He is a
graduate of the Harvard Law School, receiving his J.D. in 1969. He has also been
awarded an M.P.A. degree from the John F. Kennedy.School of Government of the
Harvard University in 1970.
1. See Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelly Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972); Chicago
v. General Motors Corp., 462 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. See Hohmann and Burman v. Packard Instrument Co., 471 F.2d 815 (7th
Cir. 1973).
3. See Murray v. Wilson Oaks Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1973).
4. See In Re O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1973);
Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972); Maxon Premix Burner
Co. v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co., 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972).
5. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
6. See Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir.
1973); Tcherepnin v. Campbell, 469 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1972).
7. See Thill Sec. Corp. v. The New York Stock Exch., 469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.
1972).
8. See Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manchester Ins. and Indem. Co., 467
F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1972).
9. See Abrodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1973); National
Family Ins. Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 474 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Borchardt, 470 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1972); Illinois State Employers Union v. Lewis,
473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972).
10. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972).
11. See Mach v. Jorgensen, 467 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972); Pickens-Kane Moving
and Storage Co. v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 468 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1972);
Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972).
12. See Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, 467 F.2d
1075 (7th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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State Supreme Court""3 ; "Class Actions"' 4; and "Special Interrogato-
ies-Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury". 5
Some of the most significant and troublesome decisions (from
the practitioner's point of view) are those which concern Rule 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This paper will discuss three recent cases decided by the Seventh
Circuit under Rule 60 with the purposes of both providing the practi-
tioner with an indication of some of the problems and pitfalls he may
be faced with under the Rule and suggesting that the philosophical
approach taken in solving some of the problems needs re-evaluation.
I. BERSHAD V. McDONOUGH, (469 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1972))
In this case, defendant-appellant McDonough, unsuccessfully ap-
pealed the denial of his Rule 60 motion by the Northern District Court
of Illinois. On June 23, 1969, the district court had entered a judgment
against McDonough for $612,000 which represented "short-swing"
profits apparently made on the purchase and sale of 272,000 shares
of a company within a six month period when he owned more than 10%
of that company's stock. McDonough's appeal was registered by the
Seventh Circuit' 6 and McDonough paid the $612,000 on January 25,
1971. On May 4, 1971, McDonough petitioned the district court for
relief under Rule 60 because of a "clerical error." He alleged that before
he had entered into the option agreement to sell the 272,000 shares of
stock, he had sold 10,000 shares to one William C. Lea at no profit to
himself and had arranged to have Lea's 10,000 shares sold as part of the
272,000. Therefore, he argued, only the profit on 262,000 shares should
have been recoverable, and, because he and his attorney had been too in-
volved with the complexities of the litigation to notice the error, the judg-
ment should be reduced by $22,000. Plaintiff's answer to this petition in-
cluded a suggestion that McDonough had intentionally concealed the
sale of the 10,000 during the trial and appeal for purposes of prevent-
ing the revelation of other damaging evidence17 , and the district court
summarily rejected the petition on May 28, 1971. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmation of the district court's rejection of the petition held
13. See Wecker v. Kilmer, 471 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1972).
14. See Johnson v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid, 467 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1972).
15. See Panther Pumps and Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1972).
16. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971).
17. 469 F.2d at 1335 n.2.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that McDonough had presented no arguments to convince the appel-
late court that the denial of his petition was an abuse of discretion.
On appeal, McDonough apparently conceded that Rule 60(a),
the "clerical error" section, did not apply, and sought to invoke Rule
60(b),'8  to cover his "inadvertent error." The court, by Judge
Castle, held that:
1. Rule 60(b)(1) and not Rule 60(b)(6) applied because the
two sections were mutually exclusive; 19
2. A motion under Rule 60(b)(1) can only be made within one
year after entry of judgment [unlike a motion under Rule 60(b) (6)];
3. The taking of an appeal does not extend the one year period;
2
1
4. McDonough's petition was not filed within the time al-
lowed, that is within one year from June 23, 1969, and therefore its
denial was proper.
The court also indicated in what is apparently dicta, that even
if his petition were timely, McDonough would not be entitled to
relief under Rule 60(b)(1) since "neither ignorance nor carelessness
on the part of a litigant or his attorney will provide grounds for rule
60(b) relief."
2'
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(1) provides the following:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrep-
resentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not
actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judg-
ment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
19. The court relied on Transit Cas. Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788,
792 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
20. Citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
21. 469 F.2d at 1337, citing Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.
1969), and other earlier cases. Hoffman talks about intentional mistakes not being
covered by Rule 60(b)(1).
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Judge Kilkenny concurred specially; he felt bound by Transit
Casualty on the one year point that an appeal does not extend the one
year limitation under Rule 60(b)(1), but stated that such a time
limit should not apply to the circumstances of this case thereby allow-
ing appellee to take advantage of this type of error.
The court's decision is illustrative of the dilemma underlying
Rule 60(b) and the failure of the Rule to satisfactorily deal with
that dilemma. The two conflicting policies that underlie Rule 60(b)
are: First, the policy of the law to favor a hearing of a litigant's claim
on the merits and, second, the policy of seeking to achieve finality
in litigation.2"
The court's first holding, i.e., that Rule 60(b)(1) rather than
60(b)(6) applies because the two sections are mutually exclusive, in-
volves more than one analytical step (although this is not made clear
by the court). The two sections are held to be mutually exclusive
based upon the Transit Casualty case which in turn is based on a
1967 Second Circuit opinion2" and a discussion in Moore's Federal Prac-
tice.24 Moore refers to the two leading United States Supreme Court
cases on the subject Klapprott v. United States,25 and Ackermann v.
United States26 to which we now turn.
Klapprott was a case in which a federal district court had en-
tered a default judgment which set aside an earlier order granting
Klapprott citizenship. Klapprott was in jail when the default judg-
ment was entered and moved to set aside the default judgment more
than four years later, while still a federal prisoner. The Supreme
Court, reversing the lower courts, remanded the case with instruc-
tions to vacate the original default judgment and to grant Klapprott a
hearing on the merits of the issues raised by the denaturalization pro-
ceeding. Five opinions were written in the case, three in favor of the
Court's judgment, and two in dissent. Justice Black's opinion (in
which Justice Douglas concurred) discussed the applicability of Rule
60(b)(6). Black said,
It is contended that the one-year limitation bars petitioner on the
premise that the petition to set aside the judgment showed, at
most, nothing but 'excusable neglect.' And, of course, the one-
year limitation would control if no more than 'neglect' was dis-
22. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2857, at
159.
23. Rivieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1967).
24. 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27(1) (2d ed. 1970).
25. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
26. 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
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closed by the petition. In that event the petitioner could not avail
himself of the broad 'any other reason' clause of 60(b) [Rule
60(b) (6)]. But petitioner's allegations set up an extraordinary
situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere'neglect' on his part. . . . The basis of his petition was not that
he had neglected to act in his own defense, but that in jail as he
was, weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the denaturali-
zation proceedings or funds to hire one, disturbed and fully oc-
cupied in efforts to protect himself against the gravest criminal
charges, he was no more able to defend himself in the . . . court
than he would have been had he never received notice of the
charges.2T
In the Ackermann case, the petitioner along with his wife and a
relative had a judgment entered against them in 1943 cancelling their
certificates of naturalization on ground of fraud. The relative ap-
pealed and won a reversal but petitioner and his wife did not. Over
four years after entry of judgment against them, petitioner and his wife
filed a motion to set aside the denaturalization judgment under Rule
60(b). They alleged that the denaturalization judgment was errone-
ous; that they did not appeal because their attorney advised them that
they would have to sell their house to pay the costs; and that a federal
officer, in whose custody they were, advised them to hold onto their
home and they would be released after the war. The district court
denied the motion and this denial was affirmed by Justice Minton
writing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Justice Black wrote
a dissenting opinion with Justices Frankfurter and Douglas concurring
in the dissent.
Justice Minton first notes that Ackermann
alleged in his motion that his failure to appeal was excusable.
[Court's italics.] A motion for relief because of excusable neglect
as provided in Rule 60(b)(1) must, by the rule's terms, be made
not more than one year after the judgment was entered. 28
Justice Minton then notes that Ackermann seeks to bring himself
within-Rule 60(b)(6).
We cannot agree that petitioner has alleged circumstances show-
ing that his failure to appeal was justifiable.
29
First, says Minton, nothing said by the federal officer (the Alien Con-
trol Officer in whose custody the Ackermanns were held) could relieve the
Ackermanns of their duty to take legal steps to protect their interests
in litigation in which the United States was their adversary. Secondly, the
27. 335 U.S. 601, 613-614.
28. 340 U.S. 193, 197.
29. Id.
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Ackermanns had no right to rely on a stranger. They had their own
attorney and confidential adviser.
Instead of relying upon that confidential adviser, [Ackermann]
freely accepted the advice of a stranger, a source upon which he
had no right to rely. Petitioner made a considered choice not to
appeal, apparently because he did not feel that an appeal would
prove to be worth what he thought was a required sacrifice of his
home. His choice was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and
such as follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of
such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his
decision not to appeal was probably wrong .... . There must
be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate
choices are not to be relieved from.30
Minton compares the Ackermann's situation with Kalpprott as follows:
From a comparison of the situations . . . it is readily apparent
that the situations of the parties bore only the slightest resem-
blance to each other. The comparison strikingly points up the
difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and free-
dom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no
chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence.3,
Justice Black's dissent clarifies his position with respect to Klapprott:
The court's interpretation of amended Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure neutralizes the humane spirit of the Rule
and thereby frustrates its purpose. The Rule empowers courts to
set aside judgments under five traditional, specified types of cir-
cumstances in which it would be inequitable to permit a judgment
to stand. But the draftsmen of the Rule did not intend that
these specific grounds should prevent the granting of similar relief
in other situations where fairness might require it. Accordingly,
there was added a broad sixth ground .... s2
On the basis of these two decisions then, it has been almost uni-
formly held that the first five sections of Rule 60(b) are mutually ex-
clusive from section (6). 3 In United States v. Karahalias"4 Judge Learned
Hand wrote an opinion reversing the denial of a motion to reopen a
default judgment of denaturalization that had been entered 17 years
prior to the time relief was sought. Karahalias had gone back to
Greece in 1929 and, because of his wife's continued illness and
30. Id. at 198.
31. Id. at 202.
32. Id. at 202-203.
33. A few early cases did not. See Nelms v. B. & 0. Ry., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D.
Ohio 1951); Weilbacher v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Fleming v.
Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ohio 1950); United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506 (M.D.
Pa. 1949). In Fleming v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. at 392, the court says, "[I]t is never too
late to set aside an unjust judgment."
34. 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953).
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World War II, found it impossible to return until 1947. Judge
Hand first found that the ground for relief was "excusable neglect"
(specifically mentioned in clause ( 1 ) ), but said,
Subsection (6) . . . if confined to situations not covered by the
first three subsections, would be extremely meagre, even assuming
that we could find any scope for it at all. Moreover, if we could,
it would be a strange purpose to ascribe to the Rule to say that,
although subsection (6) was no more than a kind of receptacle for
vestigial equities, it should be without any limit in time, while the
other and the usual equitable grounds for relief were narrowly
limited. We do not believe that this was its purpose; we think
that it was meant to provide for situations of extreme hardship,
not only those, if there be any, that subsections (1), (2), and
(3) do not cover, but those that they do. In short-to put it quite
baldly-we read the subsection as giving the court a discretionary
dispensing power over the limitation imposed by the Rule itself
on subsections (1), (2), and (3); . . .35
On a petition for rehearing, Judge Hand decided his first opinion was
contrary to Klapprott. No neglect, however excusable, says Hand,
will survive the (time) limitation of Rule 60(b)(1). However Hand
reaffirmed the result in Karahalias by finding that Karahalias' inaction
was not "neglect" and that his inaction would be covered by subsection
(6) when it resulted from forcible obstacles imposed upon him. 6
No cases have been found subsequent to Karahalias that have
directly challenged the assumption that the first five subsections of
of Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive from subsection (6). Rather
the courts in later cases, when inclined to favor granting relief, find
that "something more" than one of the grounds stated in the first
five clauses is present,3" even though the something more does not
quite reach the category of "forcible obstacles imposed upon the
movement" or an "extraordinary situation." Many cases arising under
Rule 60(b)(6) involve alleged blundering by the movant's counsel.
If the attorney misconduct is characterizable as "grossly negligent"
35. Id. at 333.
36. Id. at 334-335.
37. See Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968), where
the court relied on "far more than mere allegations of excusable neglect" and
"a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is
not warranted by the preceding clauses" to vacate a default judgment where U.S. (as
plaintiff) failed to promptly obtain default against defendant (which judgment, if
promptly filed would have been discharged in bankruptcy) and where defendant had not
been promptly notified of default judgment and was without counsel and hopelessly
insolvent. The dissenting judge thought the claim of "excusable neglect" had not been
supported by allegations, 405 F.2d at 249-250 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Bros. Inc.
v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936
(1966).
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or "inexcusable neglect", Rule 60(b)(6) has been held to apply. 8
An attorney's serious illness and death have been held to be not suffi-
cient to allow relief under 60(b)(6) rather than 60(b)(1) after more
than a year elapsedA9  But an attorney's serious personal problems
have been held to be an "other reason" justifying 60(b)(6) relief.41
Obviously it is better at times to have an attorney who is really bad
rather than one who may have been excusably negligent!
In Bershad v. McDonough the court assumes that the appel-
lant's conduct could only be encompassed under clause (1) of Rule
60(b) if at all, and then applies the "mutually exclusive" doctrine to
exclude coverage of a 60(b)(1) reason for relief under clause 60(b)(6)
after the one year time period of 60(b)(1) has expired. McDon-
ough's conduct would and should (according to the allegations he
made with his motion) logically fall under the Rule 60(b)(1) cate-
gory of excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence. 4' Is it "some-
thing more" than excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence? Hardly!
But such an unfair result, giving the appellee a windfall should not be
allowed to stand. It is the contention of this paper that the "mutually
exclusive" doctrine is not mandated by the Klapprott and Ackermann
decisions, and is in any event unjust and unworkable. Its most pro-
nounced effect has been to arbitrarily apply a one year time limit upon
some grounds for relief from judgment but not upon others.
The categories that the courts have used in the cases cited above,
to classify the grounds for relief from a final judgment that a petitioner
is using, actually fall into one of three broad areas.42 The first area
38. See Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking
Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Stuski v. U.S. Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Pa.
1962); King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D. R.I. 1969); but see, Hawkins v.
Lindsley, 327 F.2d 356 (2nd Cir. 1964); Stevens v. Stoumen, 32 F.R.D. 385 (E.D. Pa.
1963). See also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), where the Supreme
Court said, among other things, that an attorney's conduct is attributable to his client.
The doctrine is often honored in the breech.
39. Costa v. Chapkines, 316 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1963).
40. L.P. Steuart Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 824 (1964); Judge Miller dissented strongly.
41. The court does suggest, as indicated above, that as an alternative holding or
as dicta, it finds that McDonough would not even be entitled to 60(b)(1) relief for
excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertance had his motion been timely. This seems er-
roneous in view of the fact that McDonough was not given a hearing by the district court
on his motion, and therefore the allegations by the appellees that McDonough inten-
tionally concealed the sale of the 10,000 shares to Lea must be* disregarded on appeal
and only considered if the case is sent back to the disrict court for further hearings.
See nn. 16 and 17 supra.
42. In Comment, Rule 60(b): Surveys and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CAL.
L. REV. 531, 559 (1972), the student author describes these broad areas somewhat
differently.
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is where the grounds for relief are based upon prior conduct of the
party seeking relief that was deliberate or freely engaged in. When
so based, the courts seldom, if ever, grant relief. This appears to be so
whether or not the one year time period governing relief under
clauses (1) to (3) of Rule 60(b) have been met.4' Apparently in-
cludable in this first area of reasons for which the courts will not grant
relief are "mere neglect"44 and "inexcusable neglect." 5  The policy
behind refusing to relieve a party of his deliberate acts is probably a
sound one. If a deliberate choice not to appeal, or not to introduce
certain evidence, or to take some other calculated risk during the
litigation process could later be rescinded giving the litigant another
chance to try a different strategy, it is obvious that the burdens such
an approach would place upon the adversary system would be enor-
mous.46 This first area is where we would logically place Justice Min-
ton's decision in Ackermann.
The second major area is where the grounds for relief from a
final judgment are based upon prior conduct of the party seeking relief
that can be characterized by one or more of the descriptive words or
phrases found in clauses (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b). Clause (1),
which we have been primarily concerned with in this paper, lists four
reasons: mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Mo-
tions based upon these reasons must be brought within a reasonable
time, but no more than a year after the final judgment (or order) was
entered.
4 7
43. See n.6 supra.
44. See Cuewrillo v. Schulte, 324 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1963). Here the petitioner's
conduct amounted to neglect for failure to explain why he had delayed bringing his
motion for eight months. It appears that a failure to explain leaves the court with no
choice but to presume that the conduct of the petitioner was deliberate.
45. See Greenspan v. Seagram, 186 F.2d 616, 619 (2nd Cir. 1951), disallowing
relief where there had been "gross carelessness". Note that an attorney's gross neglect
may not necessarily be ascribed to a client so that an attorney's gross neglect may
amount to a forcible obstacle placed in the path of his client entitling him to relief.
See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964) and a further dis-
cussion of the problems in ascribing an attorney's negligence to his client, infra.
46. See two 1972 Seventh Circuit opinions that elaborate the reasoning behind the
concept that a party through his attorney can consciously waive certain issues by fail-
ing to raise them at the proper time: Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'r
Co., 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972); and Mack v. Earle M. Jorgensen Co., 467 F.2d
1177 (7th Cir. 1972).
A problem not discussed in this paper is whether Rule 60(b) relief should include
relief for judicial error of law, at least during the time in which an appeal could be
taken. For an analysis of this subject see Comment, Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of
Civil Judgment v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial Error of Law, 43 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 98 (1967). The comment points out that hypothetically, allowing relief
in such circumstances might extend the time for appeal under Rule 73(a).
47. Clauses (2) to (5) will not be discussed in this paper but the arguments
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The third major area is where the grounds for relief are based
upon "something more than" the reasons mentioned in clause (1);
an "extraordinary situation" where "forcible obstacles" have been
placed in the petitioner's path; "inexcusable neglect" on the part of
movant's counsel; in other words, "any other reason justifying relief"
under clause (6), which motion need only be brought within a reason-
able time. As we have seen, the courts have sometimes strained the
categories in order to grant relief on grounds that more logically fit
within clause (1), doing this in order to avoid the one year restriction
on clause (1). Clause (1) relief cannot be explicitly included under
clause (6) relief because of the "mutually exclusive" doctrine. So the
courts either fudge the matter or routinely deny relief because more
than a year has gone by since the final judgment was entered.
Notice, however, into which area Klapprott and Ackermann fit.
Ackermann, according to Justice Minton, is a case of deliberate choice
and would, therefore, seem to fit into area one. Klapprott, according to
Justice Black, was indeed a case where the petitioner was almost liter-
ally and unwilling prevented by outside forces from acting sooner. His
case, therefore, does really involve something other than neglect or ex-
cusable neglect, as those terms are ordinarily used and, therefore, fits into
area three. We need stretch no categories here to reach this conclu-
sion. The Supreme Court has never dealt with a case that it thinks falls
squarely into area two, that is a case covered by the grounds set forth
in clauses (1), (2) or (3) but where relief is sought within reasonable
time beyond the one year period. If faced with such a case (such as
Bershad v. McDonough) the Supreme Court would then have to pass
upon the validity of the "mutually exclusive doctrine," but until such
time that doctrine lives solely on the basis of dicta by Justice Black (in
which he was joined by one Justice Douglas) in Klapprott.48
Justice Black may fairly be said to have brought the validity of that
dicta into question by his dissent in Ackermann.49
herein have some bearing on questions that might arise at least under clauses (2)
and (3). The one-year time limit does not apply to clauses (4) and (5), but does
apply to clause (2) (newly discovered evidence) and clause (3) (fraud). For a good
discussion of some of the problems raised by applying the one-year provision to
clause (3), see Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60
CAL. L. REv. 531 (1972). For the text of Rule 60(b) see n.3, supra. Note that the rea-
sonable time requirement applies to all clauses of the Rule.
48. 335 U.S. at 613-614. The somewhat offhanded remark of Black's opinion
establishing this doctrine would appear to be, "And, of course, the one-year limitation
would control if no more than "neglect" was disclosed by the petition .... ." In
that event the petitioner could not avail himself of the broad "by any other reason"
clause of 60(b).
49. After all, he essentially suggests that conduct the majority thinks deliberate, or
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If there is no clearly "definitive decision" from the United States Su-
preme Court establishing the "mutually exclusive" doctrine as binding
precedent, is the doctrine soundly based upon reason and public policy
which dictate its continuance?
It has been suggested that not to apply the exclusivity doctrines
would render the word "other" in the Rule meaningless.50 Surely
however, "one would have to be singularly unmindful of the treachery
and versatility of our language to deny that as a matter of mere Eng-
lish the words . . . may carry more than one meaning."'" "Any
other reason justifying relief" certainly could, in linguistic terms, be
read to include "reasons enumerated in clauses (1), (2), or (3) where
the relief is sought beyond the one year period," without doing irrepar-
able violence to the English language.
As noted above, the policies underlying Rule 60(b) are essentially
contradictory. They are, again, the public interest in having a case de-
cided on its merits contrasted with the notion of finality, that is; the
policy that litigation must end sometime. Now in discussing the "mu-
tually exclusive" doctrine, the overriding reason that the doctrine has
any practical importance is, of course, the presence of the one-year
limitation on clauses (1), (2) and (3). The one-year limitation as-
pect of the rule promotes the policy of finality (it could hardly be ar-
gued that it promotes resolution on the merits except by use of very
sophistic logic). So presumably does the "reasonable time" limitation
of the Rule. A recent student comment 52 has suggested that Rule
60(b) be amended to reflect and define the more equitable approach
that is usually taken where the less rigid "reasonable time" provision
of the Rule is applicable. The suggested revision of Rule 60(b) pro-
poses that five factors be mentioned specifically in the Rule in order
to guide the Courts in deciding when relief should be granted under
the Rule either before or after the one year period has elapsed. The
five proposed factors are:
(1) The extent to which the party has received a full and a fair
trial on the issues;
53
the equivalent, should be subject to be included under 60(b)(6) relief, as long as the
harm suffered or the injustice perpetrated dictates relief. What, in his opinion, would
then remain of the one-year provision?
50. See Justice Reed's dissent in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 609
(1949).
51. Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 352 (1960), Justice Frankfurter dissenting,
referring to the language "where it might have been brought" in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
52. Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CAL.
L. REv. 531 (1972).
53. It has been stated that where the courts are faced with a party seeking re-
lief from a default judgment or dismissal they generally stretch to find reasons to justify
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(2) the degree of the party's own negligence or fault, his dili-
gence in seeking relief, the nature and quality of his claim or
defense, and the detriment to the party if relief is denied;
(3) the degree of the other party's fault or wrongdoing, and
the nature and quality of his claim or defense;
(4) a preference that decision be on the merits, but with due
regard to the rights of the other party and third persons and
the requirement that judgments be final;
(5) the degree to which detriment to the other party or to third
persons may be reduced by imposition of just terms on the
party seeking relief, including posting of bond to cover the
other party's costs should the moving party fail to show rea-
sons justifying relief. 4
More than likely, if these or similar standards had been applied
to Bershad v. McDonough, the movant would at least have been enti-
tled to a hearing on his motion. Would there by any justification for
applying the above set of standards or similar standards under the
present Rule? Certainly it would be equitable and sensible to do so as
long as the "mutually exclusive" doctrine does not prevent it. If the
courts were to forge ahead and apply such standards under Rule 60(b)
(6), dispensing with the "mutually exclusive" doctrine and thereby the
rigidities of the one-year provision, wouldn't they render the one-year
provision nugatory and meaningless thereby contravening the very lan-
guage of the Rule itself? Or would the one-year provision still have
a viable meaning and function within the context of the Rule? This
paper will now suggest what meaning and role the one-year provision
would still play.
The five factors that the above mentioned law review comment
thinks should be balanced when deciding whether to grant relief from
a final judgment and which it suggests be specifically incorporated into
the Rule, may perhaps be reduced to three fundamental elements that
should be taken into account:
(1) the extent of the harm or injustice to the movant in not
granting relief;
(2) the degree of diligence or speed of the movant in discov-
ering his mistake;
(3) the degree of reliance of non-movants on the finality of
the judgment.
The one-year limitation cannot fairly be interpreted to mean that once
a year has gone by after the entry of a final judgment, no movant
relief, whereas when there has been a full trial they are less willing to be broad minded.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2857, n.78.
54. The full text of the proposed revised Rule 60(b) is as follows:
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could be said to be suffering an injustice or harm (even though it was a
result of his own mistake, etc.). Nor could the one-year limitation be
fairly interpreted to mean that once a year has gone by, the non-movant
has conclusively and of necessity relied on the judgment such that it
would be to his serious detriment if relief were granted to the movant.
This point is best illustrated by looking at Klapprott, Ackermann, and
Bershad v. McDonough. How could the government ever be said to
have relied to its detriment on a final judgment in a denaturalization
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
[(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic)], misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. [The mo-
tion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken.] A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually
personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The distinction between extrinsic and
intrinsic fraud for all purposes is abolished. Relief by motion or independent
action may be allowed within a reasonable time, and not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. However, the
court may in its discretion determine that relief is justified at any time, upon
consideration of the following factors: (1) the extent to which the party has
received a full and a fair trial of the issues; (2) the degree of the party's own
negligence or fault, his diligence in seeking relief, the nature and quality of
his claim or defense, and the detriment to the party if relief is denied;
(3) the degree of the other party's fault or wrongdoing, and the nature and
quality of his claim or defense; (4) a preference that decision be on the
merits, but with due regard to the rights of the other party and third persons
and the requirement that judgments be final; (5) the degree to which detri-
ment to the other party or to third persons may be reduced by imposition
of just terms on the party seeking relief, including posting of bond to cover
the other party's costs should the moving party fail to show reasons justifying
relief. Relief for fraud upon the court may be allowed at any time, but the
court shall consider the extent to which the fraud impaired judicial impar-
tiality, the extent to which the fraud affects the public interest, and the extent
to which rights of third persons may be adversely affected if relief is granted.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and
bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for ob-
taining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Would an independent action to set the first judgment aside have been available to
McDonough under the present Rule 60(b)? The requirements that he would have
to meet in order to succeed in an independent action are very similar to the five con-
siderations set out in the Law Review Comment's proposed new Rule 60(b). See
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CiviL § 2868, at 238. If Mc-
Donough were entitled to bring and succeed in an independent action he, of course,
merely put the wrong label on his papers submitted to the Court. The result in Bershad
v. McDonough is not rendered more sound by this possibility.
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case? In Bershad, the non-movant apparently had not yet committed or
spent the essentially punitive damages he had recovered. Perhaps the
one-year provision could be read to express the sense of the drafters that
once a year has gone by after a final judgment, it must be conclusively
presumed that a movant guilty of a mistake, inadvertence, or excus-
able neglect has not been diligent in discovering his (or his at-
torney's) mistake. The Advisory Committee on the Rules recom-
mended in 1954 that Rule 60(b) be revised to read that motions be
made "within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (6)
not more than one year after the grounds thereof have accrued and are
known to the moving party." The recommendation is an interesting
one, but since it was not adopted, one might conclude that the purpose
and intent of the one-year provision was in fact to punish one who
has not been "diligent" with an arbitrary year period regardless of other
meritorious arguments the movant has for seeking relief. Such an in-
terpretation would be a reproach to the draftsmen, the Rules, and the
federal judiciary since it automatically imposes a severe penalty upon a
party for what may otherwise be a minor fault or mistake (that is, not
discovering an error in time). A better interpretation of the one-year
provision, and one which leaves the provision with some real content,
would be to conclude that the provision creates only a rebuttable pre-
sumption that after a year has elapsed, the movant has not been dili-
gent in discovering his error or the non-movant has relied to his detri-
ment. In other words, the one-year provision shifts the burden of per-
suasion onto the movant, or suggests the drafters' intent that the burden
weigh more heavily on the movant. This interpretation would probably
have saved McDonough or at least gotten him a hearing, and more im-
portantly it would allow the courts to get away from the "mutually ex-
clusive" doctrine and the arbitrary unfairness that the doctrine can
cause while at the same time not abolishing by judicial fiat any of the
language of the Rule itself.
56
To the argument that this liberalized interpretation of Rule 60(b)
would "open the floodgates" to numerous suits or motions based on
the Rule and destroy the principle of finality, the following observations
are appropriate. First, the purpose of ending congestion in the courts
should be no basis for arbitrary dismissals. Courts have been created
55. See 1955 DRAFT; PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AmENDMENTS TO RULES
OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DisTcr COuRTS 54 (1954).
56. Perhaps the most cogent analysis of Rule 60(b)(6) was expressed by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1953) before
the rehearing in that case. See inn. 34 and 35, and accompanying text, supra.
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for the very purpose of trying cases on their merits and dismissals and
default judgments should not be utilized as a handy instrument for
lessening the caseload burden.5 7  Second, while much concern has
been expressed in recent years over the congestion in our courts, there
has been little truly scientific study or experimentation to find out just
what effect changes in various procedural rules or substantive laws would
have on court congestion.58 Much is left to speculation and guesswork.
It is hardly impressive to say one will apply a rule or doctrine in a way
that produces an unjust result simply because one fears the opposite re-
sult might overcrowd the courts. Finally, it has been observed that in
states such as Wisconsin where courts have wide discretion in these
types of cases; the courts have been "sufficiently concerned with the
aims of finality."59
In brief then, while changes in the Rule itself might be desirable,
it is proposed that until this happens, the "mutually exclusive" doctrine
is neither sound in reasoning, nor required by United States Supreme
Court decisions, and ought to be abolished.
In Bershad v. McDonough the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit also held that the taking of an appeal does not extend the one-year
time period. 60 This harsh result is based upon the following reason-
ing: the Rule 60(b) motion can be made even though an appeal
has been taken and is pending. 61 The very question of whether a dis-
trict court could hear a Rule 60(b) motion while a case is on appeal
has been considered doubtful and there has been a split among the
circuits on the matter.6 2 According to the authors, Wright and Miller,
the better procedure is to allow the district court to "indicate" whether it
is inclined to grant the motion or not. 61 If not, the district court has
power to deny the motion, but if it is inclined to grant the motion, appli-
cation can be made to the appellate court to remand the case and upon
remand, the district court then has power to grant the motion. 64  In
57. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 648-649 (1962) (Black, I., dissenting
opinion).
58. See Sutro, Can the Courts Find Improvement Through Science, 45 F.R.D. 77
(1968). Typical of the non-empirical descriptive approach to the congestion problem
in recent years is a Comment, Remedies to Court Congestion, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 714
(1968).
59. See Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposals for General Reform, 60
CAL. L. REV. 531, at 568 (1972).
60. See n.20, and accompanying text, supra.
61. See Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Local 480, IBEW, 460 F.2d 105 (5th
Cir. 1972).
62. See WRIGHT & MLLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2873.
63. Id., § 2873 at 265.
64. This is the view of the Seventh Circuit, Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Electro-
Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 211 (1961).
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any event, it would seem likely that the ordinary litigant (and perhaps
the ordinary attorney) would naturally conclude that while an appeal
is pending the Rule 60 clock is not running. Again this narrow and
harsh interpretation of the Rule is fundamentally unfair in that it may
in effect impose a major penalty upon a party for a minor fault and
there is no discernable benefit to be gained in terms of "finality" or
anything else by shortening the time period.
II. BESHEAR V. WEINGAPFEL, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973)
In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant (Beshear) unsuccessfully ap-
pealed the denial of his Rule 60 motion by the Southern District Court of
Indiana. On May 20, 1970, Beshear filed a diversity suit for dam-
ages allegedly sustained when he fell while exiting from defend-
ant's tavern. After an answer had been filed and discovery com-
menced, defendant's motion was granted removing the case from the
pre-trial and trial calendars. At the pre-trial conference on January 13,
1971, Beshear's attorney announced that he had written Beshear asking
permission to dismiss the suit and that his letter further stated that if
permission were not granted, the attorney would ask the court to be
allowed to withdraw from the case. On March 8, 1971, the case was
assigned for another pre-trial conference for April 30, 1971. On March
12, 1971, plaintiff's attorney petitioned to withdraw. Attached to the
petition was a copy of a letter dated January 12, 1971, and sent
to Beshear by certified mail. This letter stated that the attorney was
going to withdraw from the case within ten days of the date of the let-
ter, and cited as reasons that he could not find witnesses that Beshear
had indicated had previously fallen at the accident site, that some
were non-existent, and that in any event the attorney had suggested
dismissing the claim which Beshear did not want to do. The attorney's
petition to withdraw was granted April 6, 1971, and a copy of the
court entry was sent to Beshear by certified mail. On April 30 neither
Beshear nor an attorney representing him showed up at the pre-trial
conference and on the same day defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute the action was granted with prejudice. A copy
of the court's entry was sent to Beshear by certified mail, and a copy of
the defendant's motion including an attorney's affadavit detailing Be-
shear's derelictions in respect to prosecuting the suit was also mailed to
Beshear. On May 24, 1971, the day the case was listed on the court
calendar for trial, Beshear by a new attorney (#2) moved for relief
from the order of dismissal. Attached to the motion was Beshear's affa-
davit (dated May 22) stating that he had not been notified that a pre-
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trial conference was to be held on April 30, 1971; and that on April
12, 1971, when he found out about the May 24 trial, he "took steps"
to obtain another attorney to appear on May 24 and ask for a continu-
ance, or if necessary to appear at trial on that date. The court treated
the motion as a Rule 60 motion.0 5 On June 18, 1971 (11 days after
defendant had filed a memorandum opposing the motion), other at-
torneys had filed an appearance for Beshear (set #3), but had presented
no additional explanations for Beshear's conduct. The district court
denied the motion and Beshear (now with a fourth set of attorneys)
appealed.
The court of appeals, in the decision by Judge Pell, stressed what
it considered to be the fact that Beshear had not set forth the date on
which he first took steps to procure new counsel; that he had not set
forth whether any trial preparations had been made in the event trial
had been found "necessary" on May 24, 1971; that he had not ex-
plained why there was a delay of three weeks from the latest time
that he could have learned of the dismissal (May 5) until May 24 in
which time he did nothing, or why his attorney (#2) had the right to
do nothing in that period and to assume that there would be a trial
on May 24 notwithstanding the dismissal, lack of a pre-trial conference,
and lack of completion of discovery; and that he had made no conten-
tion that he had a "meritorious claim." The court of appeals held
that the district court had not abused its discretion60 since the district
court action could not be said to be arbitrary.
Citing Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. 67 the court points out that
while in that case the Supreme Court expressly refrained from deciding
whether an unexplained absence from a pre-trial conference would
alone justify a dismissal, they held that that fact in the context of other
evidence of similar purport could justify a dismissal. The Court then
holds:
1. There was a context of facts in this case reflecting a lack of
65. FED. R. Crv. P. 55(c) would not apply since it only refers to relief from
entries of default and default judgments.
66. The court pointed out Beshear had followed the better practice in presenting
his motion for relief to the district court rather than launching a direct appeal, as he
might have done, but that in any event, the key question was still whether the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion. 474 F.2d at 130. The concept of leaving the
matters discussed in this paper to the trial courts discretion may be viewed as another
facet of the Federal Court System that prevents correction of certain unfair results.
That is not to say that the concept is not functional in other areas. See, Comment,
Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a Final Judgment For "Any other Reason
Justifying Relief"-Rule 60(bX6), 33 MISsouRi L. REv. 427, 432 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Equitable Power].
67. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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prosecutive intent which went beyond the mere failure to attend
the pre-trial conference;
2. The record reflected a complete absence of any regard for
the "salutary" rule68 that a Rule 60(b) motion be buttressed by a
showing of the existence of a meritorious claim or defense.
3. The district court, therefore had not abused its discretion,
and the decision of the district court was affirmed.
Circuit Judge Fairchild concurred in the result stating that
while he felt that a dismissal based solely on the failure to appear at the
pre-trial (on April 30, 1971) without notice of his duty to do so (it
could not be presumed that attorney #1 had notified Beshear of the
date) would be an abuse of discretion; lack of diligence and other de-
ficiencies in the motion to dismiss rendered the denial of relief not an
abuse of discretion.
The Court's first holding, while appearing to rely to some extent
on the opinions of Beshear's first attorney about the merits of the case,
seems to focus more upon the fact that for at least three weeks Be-
shear and/or his attorney did nothing but wait for the May 24 trial date,
apparently not preparing for trial and, therefore, probably assuming that
they could get a reinstatement and a continuance on that date. The
Court appears to be saying that this was so presumptuous of them and
shows such a lack of diligence that it is evidence that the law suit or at
least the intent to prosecute it was frivolous. Of course, if attorney #2
had been on the job for three weeks and was the one primarily responsi-
ble for such an error in judgment (as it turns out), Beshear is being
penalized for his attorney's conduct69 (although it is true that Beshear
had not indicated the date that he actually hired attorney #2). In any
event, this appears to be another example of the penalty by dismissal,
far outweighing the offense (missing a pre-trial because of lack of no-
tice, and then waiting three weeks to move for relief where the
Rule provides that relief may be sought under 60(b)(1) within a rea-
sonable time, but no more than one year after the final judgment is
entered). The Court mentions in passing the preference that cases
be heard on the merits but gives no justification for disregarding that
68. The court cited Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970) for the
most recent statement of this "salutary" rule which cannot be found in the language of
Rule 60(b) or any other Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The Gomes court held that
the lack of anything more than the mere allegations of a meritorious defense was by
itself a sufficient ground for denying relief under Rule 60(b).
69. While Link v. United States, 370 U.S. 626 (1962) holds that an attorney's
conduct is attributable to his client, we have seen that this doctrine is not always
carried to its logical conclusion. Its rigid application would lead to many malpractice
suits, or perhaps just as often, leave a client without any remedy at all.
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principle here except the vaguest generalities. No countervailing
policy seems to be served by the decision except perhaps the interest
the courts have in preserving the speed and integrity of their trial calen-
dar. The notion, however, that drastic penalties really cut down on
court congestion is, as indicated in discussing Bershad v. McDonough
speculative reasoning at best. Would not a system of fines for these
types of mistakes serve just as well and promote the ends of justice too
in the process? 70 Actually the ordinary litigant, and even the ordinary
attorney, would probably reason that to wait until May 24 in these
circumstances would be a sensible thing to do and would avoid some
paper work, especially where they anticipate that no judge would insist
that the trial proceed on May 24 anyway.
71
The Court's second holding is only slightly more acceptable than
the first in that it is at least based on well defined precedent. The re-
quirement that a party make a showing that he has a meritorious
claim or defense before being relieved of a dismissal or default judg-
ment had its origin in equity. The theory was that equity would not do
or require a useless act so, therefore, the movant had to demonstrate
that the second suit might produce a result different from the initial
dismissal or default. 72 The requirement of such a showing has, of
course, no foundation in the language of Rule 60, or any other Federal
Rule. It is therefore a potential trap for the unknowing as well as the
uncareful. The courts have differed greatly on the nature and extent
of the showing that will be necessary. 73  It is another matter lying
within the court's discretion. That the application of this principle in
the instant case appears to thwart the liberal pleading provisions of
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is virtually conceded in
70. Rule 60(b) expressly provides that relief from a default judgment may be
granted "upon such terms as are just."
71. How much time is it safe for an attorney to delay bringing this type of mo-
tion? Very, very little it seems. Two and a half months has been held to be too long.
See Consolidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wegman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d
249 (4th Cir. 1967). But see Bridoux v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
72. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2697.
73. Compare Trueblood v. Grayson Shops of Tenn., Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190 (E.D.
Va. 1963), a case essentially saying that mere statements by a defendant's attorney and
insurance agent that he had a good defense were sufficient, with Gomes v. Williams,
420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970). The Trueblood decision contains a good evaluation
of the wide variety of standards applied in these situations. 32 F.R.D. at 196-197.
The cases appear to fall into 3 categories. Many require a specific recitation of facts
in the motion which, if proven, would constitute a meritorious claim or defense. Some
allow bare allegations, conclusions, or even denials. A few treat oral statements or
the court's own assumptions as a sufficient indication of a meritorious claim or de-
fense. See Comment, Equitable Power, supra note 66, at 433-34.
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a court footnote.7 4 Nevertheless, the appellate court applies this princi-
ple in a situation where the plaintiff has had trouble retaining and
keeping an attorney and has not been able to complete discovery.
Again this holding obviously does not promote the policy that lawsuits
be heard on the merits, and it is difficult to imagine what legitimate pol-
icy it does promote. The holding is supportable only by the unproven
notion that such provisions are necessary to keep the courts free of
congestion. But the plaintiff, because of a minor error, has triggered
a procedure whereby he is denied a substantive right to have his case
heard, or at least to proceed with pre-trial discovery, a right that could
not be denied him under Rule 8, but can be if he or his attorney make
one small slip-up.
The following case, it will be seen, reaches a result that is essen-
tially the exact opposite of that reached in Beshear.
III. VAC-AIR, INC. V. JOHN MOHR & SONS, INC.,
471 F. 2d 231 (7th Cir. 1973).
In this case, Defendant-Appellant (Mohr) successfully appealed
the denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff by the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin. On September 4,
1970, plaintiff, Vac-Air, filed a complaint against Mohr charging pat-
ent infringement and common law unfair competition. Vac-Air sought a
preliminary and permanent injunction, an accounting for damages and
attorney's fees. Mohr failed to answer as required by October 20, 1970,
and Vac-Air moved for a default judgment which was heard on No-
vember 19, 1970. Mohr's attorney admitted he had been simply negli-
gent and stated that the significance of the answer might be affected
by a case pending in the Wisconsin State courts in which Mohr had
sued Vac-Air and another defendant over title to the invention in-
volved in the instant case and Vac-Air counterclaimed. The district
court judge expressed the opinion that the plaintiff should have his de-
fault, but vacated the default anyway while assessing a $200 penalty
on Mohr. Mohr then paid the fine and filed an answer and a counter-
claim, the counterclaim raising issues that were also at stake in the
state litigation. On March 4, 1971, Vac-Air served interrogatories
upon Mohr with answers due in 30 days. On April 14, Vac-Air moved
for a default judgment for failure to answer the interrogatories. On
June 14 the district judge entered a default judgment without hearing
permanently enjoining Mohr from violating the patent in question and
74. 474 F.2d at 132.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ordering an ex parte hearing to determine plaintiff's damages.7"
Meanwhile in the state court, a jury returned a verdict for Vac-Air on
all counts, and the state supreme court upheld a jury verdict for Vac-Air
against Mohr for $125,000. The ex parte hearing was held, hearing
the evidence of alleged damages, and on July 6, 1971, the district court
entered a permanent injunction against Mohr prohibiting infringe-
ment and assessed damages and costs against Mohr in an amount of
over $46,000. Mohr moved to vacate the default judgment on July 16,
attaching a letter from a doctor who stated that his attorney had been
under the doctor's care for a year for severe anxiety neurosis, hyper-
tension and other ailments requiring sedation and other treatment and
necessitating a reduction of the attorney's attention to practice. Also
attached was Mohr's attorney's affadavit to the same effect, further
pointing out that he had been trying the state case from June 10 to 16
at the very time the default order was entered (June 14). On August
31, 1971, the district court denied Mohr's motion and Mohr appealed.76
Both the June 14 and August 31 orders of the district court based
the default judgment on the failure to answer the complaint timely,
failure to answer the interrogatories timely, and failure to file a brief
in answer to Vac-Air's motion for default of April 14.
The court of Appeals, by Judge Sprecher stated that the failure
to file a brief in answer to the April 14 motion could not be taken into
consideration since no order was on the record that a brief was re-
quired and similarly the record failed to indicate that Vac-Air had
filed a brief that Mohr was required to answer. The appeals court
then indicates that the failure to answer the complaint had been fol-
lowed by the $200 fine. The appeals court finally points out that
the answers to the interrogatories were ultimately submitted one month
after they were due and that no order had been entered by the district
court compelling answers as is permitted by Rules 37(a) and (b),
but not required by Rule 37(d). The appeals court makes no men-
tion whether Mobr was asked or required to show that he had a meri-
torious claim or defense.
The court holds that the default judgment was too harsh and that
it must be vacated, with cost of the appeal assessed, however, against
Mohr. Mohr's attorney, says the court, was suffering from health
problems and while trying another case between the parties at the same
time, he was required to act in the district court as well. The court
75. 52 F.R.D. 508 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
76. 53 F.R.D. 319 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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does not condone this attorney's conduct, especially where the appear-
ance of local counsel for Mohr was also on file in the case, but con-
cludes quoting from Sapiro v. Hartfrrd Fire Insurance Co. :77
While not approving the apparent lack of diligent attention, we
are of the opinion that the imposition of the particular sanction
was too harsh under the circumstances here presented and judi-
cial discretion should have indicated other less extreme initial




Also quoting from Sapiro, the court states, "where an alternative, less
drastic, sanction would be just as effective it should be utilized. 79
The result reached by the court of appeals is praiseworthy, espe-
cially when compared with Beshear, above, where a 3-week delay was
fatal. But the state of Rule 37 with respect to sanctions that gave rise
to the district court's decision must again give us pause.s0  Rule 37
is extremely flexible with respect to sanctions. They are initially left
up to the discretion of the trial court. It has been said that justice
77. 452 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1971), quoted at 471 F.2d at 234.
78. 452 F.2d at 217.
79. Id. at 216.
80. The text of Rule 37(d), Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery, is as
follows:
(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers to
Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule
30(b) (6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper no-
tice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it
may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of
subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto,
the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or
both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on
the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing
to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b) (2) of Rule 37 provides:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or
any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedi-
ent party.
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requires that the most drastic sanctions be reserved for flagrant cases,"'
but Rule 37(d) does provide that a dismissal or a default is allowable
where a party fails to answer interrogatories or appear for a deposition
within the time alloted, even though no order has been obtained com-
pelling compliance. Until 1970, Rule 37(d) only applied if the failure
by a party was willful. The 1970 Amendments eliminated this provi-
sion, and according to the Advisory Committee notes, the presence or
absence of willfulness should now only govern the choice of sanctions.
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According to the authors, Wright & Miller, however, willfulness did, and
still may include "intentional" conduct, or a deliberate, conscious and
intentional choice to disregard the duty to answer, appear, etc.83 Mohr's
attorney here was certainly guilty of "intentional" misconduct, at least
in some sense, in the view of the district judge.
What is particularly disturbing is that the Rule leaves open on its
face (particularly after the 1970 amendments) the possibility of an
entry of default or dismissal where a party has failed to comply with a
time limit, but no court order is outstanding and the party received no
notice of his failure to observe the time requirements. Again there
is the possibility of an overwhelming penalty for a very small derelic-
tion. Would not the automatic levy of a fine in the circumstances
present in the Vac-Air case, with the accompanying notice that a
daily or periodic fine would require, better serve the ends of justice
and protect a client from the possible negligence of his attorney?
Should not an outstanding court order at least be required before a
dismissal or default is considered a proper penalty? While court
dockets may be congested, it must be kept in mind that attorneys too
may inevitably face similar "congestion" problems like those faced by
the attorney in Vac-Air.84
81. See Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1960).
82. For a complete discussion of this subject, see WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2291.
83. Id. See a compilation of cases at nn. 36 and 37 of § 2291 which compare
situations where the courts have found dismissals or default judgments proper, with
where they have been found to be erroneous.
84. For a comparison of the fierce possibilities of the Federal Rules 37(d) with
the practice in the Illinois Courts in the Chicago area, see Hon. Nicholas J. Bua,
Motion Practice in the Circuit Court of Cook County-A Cursory Outline, 54 CHICAGO
BAR RECORD 231 (1972). In Societe Internationale pour Participation Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), the Supreme Court did indicate
that there were due process limits on the penalties that could be imposed under Rule 37,
but Rogers was the extreme case and the Court held that dismissal was not proper
where a party was unable (because of a forcible obstacle) in good faith to produce
documents because prohibited from doing so by foreign law. Nevertheless the Rule
leaves open the possibility of dismissal or default for a minor error, as witnessed by
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CONCLUSION
In all three district court decisions discussed above, and in two
out of the three appeals court decisions, a party is made to suffer a de-
fault judgment or dismissal of his case because of a comparatively mi-
nor procedural error. If an attorney was responsible for the error, pre-
sumably the client could bring a malpractice suit. His chances of re-
covery would not be certain, however, and the courts would be faced
with the burden of hearing and deciding yet another case. The
"mutually exclusive" doctrine, "showing of a meritorious claim or de-
fense" doctrine, the requirement of "diligence," and the idea that the
appeals court will not upset the district court's exercise of sound dis-
cretion are all judicially created doctrines. The "one-year provision"
of 60(b) and the open-ended penalty provisions of 37(d) of course
find their source in the Rules themselves. As indicated above, the
application of these Rules and doctrines are sometimes contradictory
and often harsh. Cases involving almost identical problems reach op-
posite results for no apparent reason. Truly the law of procedure,
even under the "liberal" Federal Rules, has not yet shed its Draconian
past. The danger that a minor error can still trigger an overwhelm-
ing penalty is a situation that practitioners should be aware of and
that the courts and the Bar must seek to change. Our courts should ex-
plicitly adopt the principal that such results jurisprudentially must not
be allowed to occur."5 A more careful examination of the goals or pur-
poses of the doctrine of finality and some empirical study of the rela-
tionship between drastic penalties and reducing court congestion would
be helpful. But uniformity of approach is essential. Uniformly fair
results are even more essential.
the district court decision in Vac-Air. Commentators seem to not have raised this
problem. They seem to assume that no court would ever exercise its discretion in such
a way. See Note, Brown, Proposed Changes to Rule 33 Interrogations and Rule 37
Sanctions, 11 AIZONA L. REV. 443, 451-455 (1969); and Proposed 1967 amendment
to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUMBIA L. REV. 271, 291-296 (1968).
85. For a suggestion that the existence of severe penalties hampers the conduct
civil litigation because greater hostility develops between the parties see, Schwartz and
Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 274, 279 (1967). For a suggestion
that is completely contrary to the thrust of this paper, indicating that the one year
requirement should be more strongly enforced and that Klapprott was wrong, see
Comment, Equitable Power, supra note 66, at 434-441.
